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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the role of monetary and open economy indicators in inflation 
targeting (IT) economies through the analysis of a nested Phillips curve/ P-star model 
for Chile and Mexico. For Chile a real money gap and a money growth indicator are 
found to be relevant in predicting deviations of observed from target inflation. In 
contrast, for Mexico a real exchange rate gap, a standard measure of the real exchange 
rate, and a money growth indicator are consistently significant as predictors of 
deviations of actual from (i) expected (in the pre-IT period) and (ii) target inflation (in 
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INFLATION TARGETING AND MONETARY ANALYSIS 
IN CHILE AND MEXICO 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During the 1990s a substantial number of countries have adopted inflation targeting (IT) 
as a formal monetary policy strategy (See Bernanke et al, 1999; Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2001; Amato and Gerlach, 2002). A by-product of this trend is that once such a 
policy is in place several momentous operational questions have to be addressed. For 
instance, is there a role for monetary and open economy indicators in the conduct of 
monetary policy in these economies? See, for instance, the related studies by 
Baltensperger et al (2001) on Switzerland; Batini and Nelson (2001) on the UK and the 
US; and Gerlach and Svensson (2001), Rudebusch and Svensson (2002), and Trecroci 
and Vega (2002) on the Euro area.  
There are two ways in which money can be utilised by monetary policy makers: 
(1) as an information and/or (2) predictive variable. The first one critically depends on 
the stability of the money demand function, a topic widely studied in the literature. 
Basically, monetary aggregates might provide useful information if they are expected to 
help in the prediction of imperfectly observed variables that are of interest to the 
monetary authorities (e.g. aggregate output). In contrast, money’s role as a predictor 
becomes relevant if the central bank’s strategy (e.g. inflation targeting) implies the use 
of expectations of future variables that it can help to predict (see Svensson, 1997). The 
usefulness of money as a predictor is the main interest of the present investigation. 
Particularly, this paper inquires into the predictive content of monetary 
indicators in the conduct of monetary policy in two Latin American emerging market 
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economies: Chile and Mexico
1
. In so doing an augmented P-star model is employed. 
The P-star model was advanced by Hallman et al (1991), who investigated the 
usefulness of the M2 monetary aggregate in the US for inflation forecasting purposes. 
This inquiry considers as a starting point the augmented version of such a model 
analysed by Gerlach and Svensson (2001), and Trecroci and Vega (2002), but also 
incorporating open economy elements. Chiefly, the proposed specification considers 
real money, output, and exchange rate gaps within a nested Phillips curve/P-star 
framework.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
monetary policy and inflation targeting in Chile and Mexico. A Phillips curve/P-star 
based model of inflation and money is expounded in section 3. The data and its 
univariate characteristics, as well as the estimation of the several gap measures are dealt 
with in section 4. The block Granger non-causality methodology is elucidated, and the 
corresponding analyses of the Philips curves are undertaken, in section 5. Concluding 
remarks are contained in section 6.  
 
2. Monetary policy and inflation targeting in Chile and Mexico2 
 
Inflation targeting (IT) is a monetary policy strategy that became popular in the 1990s, 
New Zealand being the first country to adopt it in 1990
3
. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
                                               
1
 It is worth pointing out that these countries have in the past provided a fertile ground 
for comparative economic analyses. E.g. Arrau and De Gregorio (1993); Edwards 
(1998). 
2
 A detailed explanation of IT in Chile and Mexico, and other Latin American 
economies, is furnished in the works of Mishkin and Savastano (2000), and Corbo and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2001). 
3
 See Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) for a clear analysis of inflation targeting 
countries’ experience with such a policy. 
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Mexico, and Peru are a group of Latin American countries that have adopted IT as their 
monetary policy strategy. Amongst this group, Chile and Mexico provide two 
interesting cases, not least because similar circumstances and corresponding policy 
responses have in the past been observed in these economies (e.g. Edwards, 1998)
4
. 
Remarkably in the context of the present investigation, the Central Bank of Chile 
adopted inflation targeting in order to achieve disinflation, whereas it can be argued that 
the Bank of Mexico did so having a relatively low and stable inflation. In what follows 
a closer look is taken at the developments in monetary policy making in these 
economies. 
 
2.1. Chile 
 
Chile formally granted independence to its central bank in 1989. Alongside this step 
came a mandate to have inflation as the monetary policy makers’ primary objective. In 
1990 a more formal monetary policy stance was signalled by the announcement of an 
inflation target to fall within a range of 15-20% for 1991.  
 It is worth noting that from the mid-1980s until August 1999 the Central Bank 
of Chile had an exchange rate band regime in place. Nevertheless, after the formal 
introduction of IT the authorities have always made clear that their primary objective is 
the pre-announced inflation target. The exchange rate band was supposed to help in 
keeping the real exchange rate at a level consistent with external equilibrium. However, 
                                               
4
 Focusing on Chile and Mexico within this group is also supported by the fact that 
Colombia and Peru cannot be unambiguously classified as inflation targeting countries, 
as noted by Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001). On the other hand, Brazil experienced 
very high inflation at the beginning of the 1990s, which complicates an analysis of the 
type undertaken in this paper. 
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in 1998 the Chilean monetary authorities did not allow the exchange rate to depreciate 
in order to accommodate a negative terms of trade shock. Instead, their policy reaction 
was to raise interest rates and narrow the exchange rate band. This led to the IT being 
undershot in that year.   
This isolated episode aside, and as can be seen in Table 1, and graphically in 
Figure 3, Chile’s IT has been successfully reduced after its introduction, helping to 
bring down inflation from 29% (1990.Q4) to 3.8% (1999.Q1). From 1995 the central 
bank started to announce a point rather than a range IT. Moreover, in the light of this 
success in 2000 the Central Bank of Chile committed to a target of 2-4% for 2001 
onwards. It is important to emphasise that the success of the IT strategy in Chile is also 
a product of fiscal surpluses, and a tight regulation and supervision of the financial 
system.  
 
2.2. Mexico 
 
December 1987 is an important date in the recent history of the Mexican economy, 
since it was on this date that the ‘Pacto’ stabilisation programme was introduced. As a 
result, in the lapse between 1987 and 1991 monetary policy in Mexico was based on a 
pegged exchange rate regime. Also, under this strategy government spending saw a 
marked decrease. This prudent fiscal management helped in the reduction of the 
inflation rate from 132% (1987) to around 20% (1989), while output growth increased 
from 1.4% (1987) to 12.9% (1989). In fact, Cecchetti et al (2000) argue, and support 
empirically, that monetary policy in Mexico became more efficient, as measured by the 
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lower variability of inflation and output, from 1991 onwards, at least in part due to the 
policies undertaken in the late 1980s. 
 Accordingly, and in order to provide a more flexible exchange rate framework, 
the Bank of Mexico adopted exchange rate bands in 1991. However, this period came to 
an abrupt halt in December 1994, with the well-known Mexican crisis that coined the 
‘Tequila effect’. The economic and political developments that led to such a meltdown 
implied a substantial widening of the prevalent exchange rate band, and therefore a 
devaluation of the Peso. 
 At the beginning of 1995 the Mexican authorities aborted the pegged exchange 
rate regime, switching to a policy in which the monetary base played a mayor role (See 
Khamis and Leone, 2001). This new policy stance included the announcement of an 
annual inflation target of 19%, which was subsequently increased to 42% due to the 
Peso’s instability. Although the announced target of 17% for the monetary base was 
achieved, the inflation rate was 10% higher than the announced goal. 
 The Bank of Mexico continued to announce targets for money and inflation in 
the next two years, but without success. In 1998 the inflation target was missed by 7%, 
even though the target for base money was undershot by 1.5%. Under these 
circumstances the monetary authorities tried to reassure the public that their main goal 
was to control inflation. With the more formal implementation of an IT monetary policy 
in 1999, Mexican monetary policy’s effectiveness has consolidated. Notably, Mexico’s 
inflation has experienced a reduction from 17.6% (1998.Q4) at IT adoption to 10.6% 
(2000.Q1). 
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3. A model of inflation and money 
 
The investigation is based on an augmented version of the *P  model of Hallman et al 
(1991). The 
*P concept arises from a simple representation of the quantity theory 
equation 
 
MV PY           (1) 
 
where M is nominal money, V is the average velocity of circulation, P  is the aggregate 
price level, and Y is aggregate nominal output. Re-arranging (1) and assuming long run 
values for *V and 
*Y produces 
 
* *
*
M
P V
Y
 
  
 
 .         (2) 
 
In (2) M determines 
*P . Substituting (2) in (1), and after further manipulations the 
following arises 
 
* * *( ) ( )p p y y v v     .        (3) 
 
In (3) all the variables are expressed in logs. The key element in (3) is the price gap 
( *p p ) component, which plays a prominent role in the determination of inflation in a 
Phillips curve equation of the form  
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*
1 1 1( )
e
t t t t tp p         ,        (4) 
 
where 0  . As can be seen, the *P  model substitutes the output gap and velocity with 
the negative of the price gap as the main determinant of inflation. This is the ‘baseline’ 
inflation adjustment equation in Hallman et al (1991). The theoretical models by 
McCallum (1980) and Mussa (1981), for instance, also incorporate adjustment 
equations analogous to (4). 
Gerlach and Svensson (1999), and Trecroci and Vega (2002) consider a nested 
version of the price gap and Phillips curve models for empirical purposes. The structure 
of this model is composed of the following elements,  
 
* *
1 1 1 11
( ) ( )et t t t t tt t y y m m                   (5) 
1
ˆe
tt t
 

           (6) 
0( )t t t y t R t tm m p y R               (7) 
* * *
0t t y t R tp m y R              (8) 
* * * * *
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t y t R tm p m p p p m p y Rm m                 (9) 
 
 Equation (5) is a mixture of a Phillips curve and a price gap model of inflation, 
where  ,
e
 , y , *y , m , and *m  are actual and expected inflation rates, output and 
potential output, and actual and long run real money balances, respectively.   and 
  are parameters to be estimated empirically.   is expected to be a well-behaved 
disturbance term. 
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 Equation (6) specifies how inflation expectations (
e
 ) are formed, where ˆ  is the 
central bank’s inflation objective. Note that this implies that the model focuses on 
explaining deviations of inflation from its target. 
 Equation (7) is a long-run money demand function, which assumes a standard 
specification. In (7) y  is real output and R  is a measure of the opportunity cost of 
holding money. 0 , y , and R  are parameters to be estimated, and  is expected to 
be a well-behaved disturbance term. 
 Equation (8) generates the equilibrium price level (
*
p ), for a level of the money 
stock assuming that the other variables in the model are at their equilibrium levels, 
by inverting the long-run money demand given by equation (7). 
 Equation (9) defines the real money gap as the negative of the price gap. 
A further element that should be considered in the empirical assessment of the 
above model is the role of the exchange rate. Svensson (2000), for instance, provides 
three key reasons as to why this is particularly important for inflation targeting open 
economies. Firstly, the exchange rate explicitly allows for an additional channel through 
which monetary policy can be transmitted. Secondly, the exchange rate is a forward-
looking variable, and therefore can provide valuable information in the design and 
implementation of monetary policy. Thirdly, foreign shocks mainly propagate thorough 
the exchange rate.  
In addition to the above elements, in a thought provoking paper Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002, page 394) note that "…central bankers in emerging market economies 
appear to be extremely mindful of external factors in general and the foreign exchange 
value of their currency, in particular." Some of the reasons Calvo and Reinhart highlight 
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for the important role played by the exchange rate in monetary policymaking, and which 
give rise to what they label fear of floating, even under an IT regime, are 
 Liability dollarisation; 
 Output costs associated with exchange rate fluctuations; 
 Inelastic supply of funds at time of crises; and 
 Lack of credibility and fear of loss of access to the international capital markets. 
In the light of these factors the present paper proposes a further augmentation of 
equation (5) as follows 
 
* * *
1 1 1 1 1 11
( ) ( ) ( )
e
t t t t t t t tt t
y y m m e e                   .   (10) 
 
Equation (10) incorporates departures of actual ( e ) from equilibrium (
*e ) exchange 
rates, where   is a parameter to be estimated. 
 
4. Data 
 
Data on money, real income, prices, interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation 
objectives are employed in the empirical analyses that follow. The data are monthly, 
and span from 1990.01 to 2001.06 for Chile, and from 1986.01 to 2001.06 Mexico
5
. In 
what follows all the time series are expressed in logs, with the exception of the interest 
                                               
5
 Note that for Chile the data covers only the IT regime, whereas for Mexico the 
statistical information encompasses several periods. Specifically, a pegged exchange 
rate policy (1987-1991), an exchange rate band (1991-1994), monetary targeting (1995-
1998), and inflation targeting (1999-present). 
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rates, which are expressed in percentage points. The definitions and sources of the data 
are contained in Table A1.  
In order to ascertain the order of integration of the economic time series under 
scrutiny the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) is implemented. 
Panel A of Table 2 displays the results. All the series seem to contain a unit root in their 
levels, but become stationary after being differenced. The exceptions are e  and 
Dp , 
and p  for Chile, which appear (2)I and (0)I , respectively. Nevertheless, in assessing 
the above results the reader should bear in mind the low power of these tests in rejecting 
the null of a unit root. The univariate properties of the data under scrutiny can be further 
examined by glancing at Figures 1 and 2, which present data for Chile and Mexico, 
respectively.  
 
4.1. Inflation objectives 
 
The variable ˆ is given by the annual inflation target announced by the Central Bank of 
Chile and the Bank of Mexico (Table 1). However, in the light of the fact that the Bank 
of Mexico adopted a ‘formal’ IT from January 1999 (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 
2001) expected inflation (
e ) up to that point in time is used in estimating the structural 
model. Such a variable is proxied by the filtered series derived from  by applying a 
univariate structural time series model and the Kalman filter (Harvey, 1989; Koopman 
et al, 2000). This variable intends to reproduce the economic agents’ expected inflation 
by using a technically compelling technique. Details on this estimation are provided in 
Appendix 2. Figures 3 and 4 display actual and target inflation for Chile; and actual, 
expected, and target inflation for Mexico, respectively. 
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4.2. Output gaps 
 
The output gap series, (y – y*), are expressed as deviations of log output from its 
potential. Potential real output, y
*
, is the smoothed series estimated from y  by applying 
a basic structural model (BSM) and the Kalman filter (See Koopman et al, 2000). 
 
4.3. Exchange rate gaps  
 
In estimating the exchange rate gaps bivariate (stage three) cointegration tests of PPP 
were applied (See Froot and Rogoff, 1995; Edwards and Savastano, 1999), after 
experimenting with alternative specifications. In equation form  
 
*
( )t t t te p p      ,        (11) 
 
where e is the nominal exchange rate measured in units of home currency per unit of 
foreign currency, while p  and *p  are the domestic and foreign price levels, 
respectively. Equation (11) implies that the exchange rate between the currencies of two 
countries should equal the ratio of their price levels. Note that in (11)  is expected to be 
around one.  
Panel B of Table 2 exhibits the long run solutions to the autoregressive 
distributed lag ( ADL ) (Hendry, Pagan, and Sargan, 1984) PPP cointegrating relations
6
. 
The coefficients are statistically significant and economically interpretable, with values 
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of 0.92 and 0.88 for Chile and Mexico, respectively. Furthermore, the ADF test applied 
to the residuals of such equations rejects non-stationarity. Henceforth, PPP 
cointegrating relations hold for Chile and Mexico (See Froot and Rogoff, 1995; and 
Edwards and Savastano, 1999, for related empirical evidence). These results are 
employed in the computation of the real exchange rate gaps for both economies. 
 
4.4. Real money gaps 
 
A simple, textbook, money demand relationship relating real monetary balances to a 
scale variable and a measure of the opportunity cost of holding money, such as equation 
(7), is used to estimate the real money gaps. Panel B of Table 2 displays the long run 
solutions to the corresponding ADL  equations. All the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant and have economically sensible coefficients. Notably, the 
estimated income elasticities, 1.72 for Chile and 1.38 for Mexico, are similar in 
magnitude to those obtained by Edwards (1998, Table A2, page 700).  
Furthermore, these elasticities could be seen as endorsing the findings of Arrau 
and De Gregorio (1993). These authors explicitly consider, and find a role for, financial 
innovation in the modelling of the demand for 
1M  in Chile and Mexico. One simple 
way of rationalising the income elasticities greater than unity displayed in Table 2 is by 
hypothesising that money has increased faster than output in the period under analysis, 
and therefore the velocity of circulation has decreased in this time span. This conjecture 
is validated by Figure 5, which shows a decreasing velocity of circulation of 2M  for 
                                                                                                                                         
6
 Note that for Chile (11) is an unbalanced regression, given that (2)e I  and 
*( ) (1)p p I  (See Banerjee et al, 1993). The ADL specification used should, however, 
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Chile and Mexico during the period under scrutiny. In the light of the fact that this paper 
analyses a broad monetary aggregate, the above patterns could be arising, for instance, 
as a result of more advanced financial services, which should allow consumers to hold 
more of their money in the non-money component of 
2M without compromising their 
liquidity. However, other factors, e.g. generated by policy, could also be playing a role. 
Finally, the ADF test applied to the residuals of such equations rejects non-
stationarity. Consequently, money demand cointegrating relations exist for Chile and 
Mexico during the periods under investigation. These results are used in the calculation 
of the real money gaps for both economies. 
At this point it is convenient to exhibit graphically the output, money, and 
exchange rate gaps calculated for Chile and Mexico, which are gathered in Figure 6. 
 
5. Block Granger non-causality analyses 
 
As highlighted by Stock and Watson (2001), due to the rich lag dynamics implied in the 
application of vector autoregressions (VARs) to time series data, statistics derived from 
such estimations, such as Granger causality tests, tend to be more informative than the 
usual regression coefficients. In the empirical assessment of the model outlined in 
section 3 this paper computes multivariate and bivariate block Granger non-causality 
tests for Chile and Mexico. 
The econometric methodology behind the block Granger non-causality test can 
be illustrated by using an augmented vector autoregression of order n , VAR ( n ), such 
as  
                                                                                                                                         
help to address that issue. 
 14 
 
0
1
n
t i t i t t
i
y t y x  

             (12) 
 
where ty  is a 1m  vector of jointly determined (endogenous) variables, t  is a linear 
time trend, tx  is a 1p  vector of exogenous variables, and t is a well-behaved 
disturbance term. If in (12) ty  is divided in two subsets 1ty  and 2ty , which are 1 1m  and 
2 1m   vectors, respectively, and 1 2m m m  , the following block decomposition can be 
written down 
 
1 10 11 ,11 1, ,12 2, 1 1
1 1
n n
t i t i i t i t t
i i
y t y y x   
 
             (13) 
2 20 21 ,21 1, ,22 2, 2 2
1 1
n n
t i t i i t i t t
i i
y t y y x   
 
         . 
 
The hypothesis that the subset 2ty is not Granger causal on 1ty is given by 12 0  , with 
12 1,12 2,12 3,12 ,12( , , ,..., )n      . The log-likelihood ratio statistic that arises from 
testing 
12 0   has 1 2m m n degrees of freedom, and is
2  asymptotically distributed7. 
 
5.1. Chile 
 
The study proceeds by analysing equation (10), that is, the joint impact of *y y , 
*m m  , and *e e on ˆ  . The outcome of the multivariate block Granger non-
                                               
7
 See Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) for further details on this methodology. 
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causality VAR tests are reported in Table 3. For Chile they support the joint 
significance of *y y , *m m  , and *e e on ˆ  .  
However, the corresponding bivariate tests show that the hypothesis of non-
causality can only be rejected for the real money gap. Therefore, it can be said that for 
Chile the 
*P  model provides some rationale for using a real money gap indicator in the 
conduct of monetary policy under an IT regime. These outcomes are further analysed 
below.  
 
5.2. Mexico 
 
Following the results in Cecchetti et al (2000) the baseline estimation period adopted for 
Mexico is 1991.01-2001.06. As mentioned above, these authors find that monetary 
policy in Mexico became more effective from 1991. Additionally, given that in Mexico 
a formal IT strategy is dated as having initiated in 1999 the study analyses three periods: 
1991.01-2001.06, 1991.01-1998.12, and 1999.01-2001.06. If the way in which money 
and the other relevant variables considered affect inflationary developments have 
changed due to the introduction of IT this should be reflected through the estimates for 
each period. 
 As for Chile, Mexico’s outcomes reject the hypothesis of non-causality from 
*y y , *m m  , and *e e to ˆ   for the three time spans under analysis. However, 
the bivariate results indicate that of these indicators only 
*e e  is individually 
significant (at the 7%) during 1991.01-2001.06. Furthermore, 
*e e  also seems to 
contain significant information (at the 1% level) on determining ˆ   in the sub-
periods 1991.01-1998.12 and 1999.01-2001.06. Table 3 also shows that *y y and 
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*m m   help in predicting ˆ  , but only for the post-IT regime ranging from 1999.01 
to 2001.06.  
 
5.3. Robustness check 
 
In order to establish the robustness of the results contained in the previous sub-sections 
bivariate block Granger non-causality VAR tests are employed using alternative money, 
output, and exchange rate indicators. The output gap proxy is achieved by passing y  
through the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HPF) (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) using a value of 
129,600 for the HPF’s smoothness parameter , as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) 
for the analysis of monthly data. Also, two money growth measures, m  and m y  , 
and a standard real exchange rate indicator, REXR , are considered. Note that m  and 
y are calculated as annual changes in the log of the money and output variables, 
respectively, whereas REXR  is given by *e p p  .   
The outcome of the bivariate block Granger non-causality tests are reported in 
Table 4. For Chile only the output gap and nominal money growth indicators are found 
to be significant. Similarly, Mexico’s results endorse the previous findings: the 
indicator REXR contains statistically significant information on inflation in the three 
periods under scrutiny. So it can be argued that the exchange rate is a consistently 
useful predictor of inflation in Mexico during the last decade, and should be a closely 
monitored variable by the monetary authorities. These comes as no surprise, particularly 
in the time span under scrutiny, which encompasses the well-documented Mexican 
exchange rate crisis of 1995 [See, for instance, the November 1996, volume 41, issue of 
the Journal of International Economics.]  
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Similarly, but in contrast to Mexico's case, it seems that in Chile the role played 
by the exchange rate was not statistically significant. This could be reflecting the 
effectiveness of the exchange rate band regime implemented by Chile during most of 
the sample period under study, referred to in section 9.2.1. Specifically, Reinhart and 
Rogoff's (2002) novel approach to the classification of exchange rate regimes 
catalogues Chile's exchange rate regimes during 1989-2001 as: pre-announced crawling 
band around the US Dollar (June 1, 1989-January 22, 1992), de facto announced 
crawling band around the US Dollar (January 22, 1992-June 25,1998), pre-announced 
crawling band to US Dollar (June 25, 1998-September 2, 1999), and managed floating 
(September 2, 1999-December 2001). 
Additionally, for Mexico m is rejected as being non-causal on ˆ  during 
both 1991.01-1998.12 and 1999.01-2001.06, whereas *( )HPF y y  is so only for the 
post IT period. From this last findings it is natural to derive the preliminary conclusion 
that at the early stages of an IT regime the monetary authorities should be particularly 
careful in monitoring a wide array of variables. 
 
Interim summary of findings 
 
The main findings of the paper so far, derived from multivariate and bivariate Granger 
non-causality tests, show that deviations of inflation from target are explained 
 
 In Chile and Mexico: jointly by the real money, output, and exchange rate gaps; 
 In Chile: individually by the real money gap, a real output gap calculated by 
applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter, and a real money growth indicator; 
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In Mexico: individually, and across pre and post-IT periods, by the real money, output, 
and exchange rate gaps, and a real output gap calculated by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott filter, real money growth and real exchange rate indicators. 
 
5.3. Generalised impulse responses 
 
The research proceeds by calculating the generalised impulse response functions (GIRs) 
of ˆ   from shocks to the multivariate and bivariate VARs containing the variables 
found to be statistically relevant in the previous sections. Why are GIRs useful in the 
analysis of a VAR model? Impulse responses aid in visually determining the impact 
through time of a one-off shock to a given variable on a system, other variables, or 
itself. Koop et al (1996), and Pesaran and Shin (1998) show that GIRs are more 
convenient than the widely used orthogonalised approach to impulse responses 
championed by Sims (1980) because, in contrast to the orthogonalised impulse 
responses, the results obtained from the generalised ones are invariant to the ordering of 
the variables in the VAR. The reader should note, however, that the generalised and 
orthogonalised impulse responses are the same for the bivariate VARs. 
 Figures 7 and 8 show the outcomes of these exercises for Chile and Mexico, 
respectively. Figure 7’s panel (a) exhibits the GIR of ˆ   to a one standard error 
shock to the equation for the real money gap in a VAR containing *y y , *e e and 
ˆ  . Notably, the impact of that shock on inflation lasts up to the 24th month. This is 
in harmony with the well known long and variable lags in the transmission of monetary 
impulses postulated by Milton Friedman (1961) (See also Batini and Nelson, 2001, for a 
related study). Figure 7’s panel (b) displays the positive impact on ˆ  of a one 
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standard error shock to the equation for the *( )HPF y y  in a VAR containing 
*( )HPF y y , *m m  , *e e , and ˆ   8.  
 The variables found to be most robust (i.e. significant in the various sub-periods 
considered) in explaining inflation in Mexico, namely *e e , REXR , and m  , are 
examined for the full sample period (1991.01-2001.06) by studying the GIRs arising 
from shocks to the VAR equations explaining their behaviour. In a VAR containing 
*y y , *m m , *e e and ˆ   a positive impact on ˆ   from a disturbance to the 
equation for *e e  is shown in Figure 8’s panel (a), lasting up to twelve months.  
The effect of ruffling the equation for REXR , displayed in panel (b), generates 
an analogous pattern. These two graphs visually demonstrate the forefront role played 
by the exchange rate in determining Mexico’s inflationary dynamics. Finally, panel (c) 
portrays that shocks to m  can generate significant swings on ˆ  , lasting up to two 
years. Henceforth, the role of money should also be carefully assessed in the conduct of 
monetary policy in Mexico. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses the role of monetary and open economy indicators in the conduct of 
monetary policy in two inflation targeting Latin American economies: Chile and 
Mexico. A nested P-star/Phillips curve model is developed and estimated. The main 
findings of the analyses reveal that for Chile both the real money gap and real money 
growth indicators contain significant information on deviations of inflation from the 
inflation target.  
                                               
8
 This VAR is significant, as shown by the corresponding test 98.37(0.00**)LR  . 
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In contrast, for Mexico different measures of the real exchange rate are found to 
be consistently relevant in the pre and post-IT (1999) periods. This is also the case for a 
real money growth indicator. These results are of considerable importance to 
policymakers. Remarkably, they convey that neglecting the role that monetary and open 
economy indicators play in monetary policy making within an IT framework could be 
detrimental to the successful operation of such a strategy. 
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Table 1 Chile and Mexico 
Inflation targeting: Adoption dates and targets width 
 
Country Date 
introduced 
Target price 
index 
Target width 
Chile January 1991 Headline CPI 1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
15-20% 
13-16% 
10-12% 
9-11% 
8% 
6.5% 
5.5% 
4.5% 
4.3% 
3.5% 
2-4% 
Mexico January 1999 Headline CPI 1999 
2000 
2001 
13% 
10% 
6.5% 
 
Source. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Table 2.  
Note: CPI = consumer price index. 
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Table 2 Chile and Mexico 
Unit root and cointegration tests 
 
A. ADF unit root tests 
Variables Levels First differences ( 12 ) 
Chile 
(1991.02-
2001.06) 
Mexico  
(1987.02-
2001.06) 
Chile 
(1992.02-
2001.06) 
Mexico 
(1988.02-
2001.06) 
m  -2.368 -0.6335 -2.937* -5.194** 
y  -2.422 -0.7214 -3.006* -4.365** 
R  -2.710 -2.519 -3.483* -3.926** 
e  0.336 -2.488 -1.665 -3.815** 
Dp  -1.773 -1.763 -1.812 -7.265** 
p  -6.586** -2.042 -2.927* -6.783** 
*p  0.022 -1.685 -3.870** -3.748** 
*Dp p  -0.782 -1.949 -3.554** -7.228** 
B. Long run solutions to ADL equations 
Variables Chile (1991.01-2001.07) Mexico (1988.01-2001.06) 
Money demand 
Equation (1) 
PPP 
Equation (2) 
Money demand 
Equation (3) 
PPP 
Equation (4) 
Cons  -1.21 (0.448)** 6.24 (0.025)** 9.03 (0.693)** 1.53 (0.071)** 
y  1.72 (0.078)** - 1.38 (0.143)** - 
R  -0.02 (0.011)* - -0.003 (0.001)** - 
  - 0.92 (0.093)** - 0.88 (0.087)** 
ADF  test -8.052 (-4.40) -7.908 (-3.98) -9.465 (-4.37) -8.904 (-3.96) 
2WALD   493.74 (2)** 97.84 (1)** 262.72 (2)** 101.367 (1)** 
Notes. - Part A: the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) is based on a regression of the 
form 

 
T
i
tittt tyyy
1
1  , where t is a random error term, and  and t 
are a constant and time trend, respectively. The ADF test corresponds to the value of the 
t-ratio of the coefficient . The null hypothesis of the ADF test is that yt is a non-
stationary series, which is rejected when  is significantly negative. Only a constant was 
added to the tests. ** and * denote rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 1% and 
5% level, respectively. Part B: (1) Coefficients’ standard errors are inside parentheses. 
2WALD    is a test of the null that all long-run coefficients are zero, with 
2( )  distribution (2) ADL = autoregressive distributed lag. Critical values (1%) for the 
ADF test applied to the residuals of the cointegrating relations are from MacKinnon 
(1991), and are shown in parentheses next to the corresponding ADF statistic. A 
significant test means rejection of the hypothesis of non-stationarity, i.e. a cointegrating 
relationship exists between the variables under analysis. (3) ** and * denote a 
coefficient/test is significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. (4) The ADL  
equations initially allowed for twelve lags of each of the variables considered, reducing 
the corresponding initial systems using a general to specific modelling strategy. Further 
details on these procedures can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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Table 3 Chile and Mexico 
Multivariate and bivariate block Granger non-causality VAR tests of the augmented Phillips curve/P-star model 
 
Null hypotheses LR test statistic (probability) 
Chile Mexico 
1992.09-
2001.06 
Lags 1991.01-
2001.06 
Lags 1991.01-
1998.12 
Lags 1999.01-
2001.06 
Lags 
*y y
*m m   
*e e  
Non causal on 
ˆ   
76.909 
(0.000)** 
10 51.302 
(0.047)* 
12 98.816 
(0.000)** 
12 33.483 
(0.004)** 
5 
*y y  Non causal on 
ˆ   
0.776 
(0.678) 
2 5.752 
(0.569) 
7 5.664 
(0.685) 
8 13.763 
(0.017)* 
5 
*m m   Non causal on 
ˆ   
26.648 
(0.009)** 
12 11.081 
(0.522) 
12 11.244 
(0.423) 
11 24.733 
(0.010)** 
11 
*e e  Non causal on 
ˆ   
8.242 
(0.766) 
12 20.257 
(0.062)†  
12 47.948 
(0.000)** 
12 37.452 
(0.000)** 
12 
Notes: the block Granger non-causality statistic is calculated through a LR test, and has a 2 distribution. The test statistics are displayed 
with corresponding probability values inside parentheses. For both countries an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) of an initial lag 
order of 12 was used. For Mexico, the multivariate estimations for 1999.01-2001.01 start with 6 lags due to data limitations. The lag 
lengths were determined through the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC). † , * and ** denote rejection of the null at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 27 
Table 4 Chile and Mexico 
Bivariate block Granger non-causality VAR tests of the robustness of the augmented Phillips curve/P-star model 
 
Null hypotheses LR test statistic (probability) 
Chile Mexico 
1992.09-
2001.06 
Lags 1991.01-
2001.06 
Lags 1991.01-
1998.12 
Lags 1999.01-
2001.06 
Lags 
( *)
HPF
y y
 
Non causal on 
ˆ   
21.572 
(0.010)** 
9 10.050 
(0.526) 
11 15.811 
(0.148) 
11 21.291 
(0.011)* 
9 
m   Non causal on 
ˆ   
19.995 
(0.067)†  
12 15.807 
(0.200) 
12 25.757 
(0.012)* 
12 26.012 
(0.004)** 
10 
m y  
 
Non causal on 
ˆ   
10.376 
(0.497) 
11 5.625 
(0.897) 
11 13.724 
(0.249) 
11 0.476 
(0.490) 
1 
REXR  Non causal on 
ˆ   
12.042 
(0.442) 
12 22.624 
(0.031)* 
12 60.235 
(0.000)** 
12 23.539 
(0.009)** 
10 
Notes: the block Granger non-causality statistic is calculated through a LR test, and has a 2 distribution. The test statistics are displayed 
with corresponding probability values inside parentheses. For both countries an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) of an initial lag 
order of 12 was used. The lag lengths were determined through the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC). † , * and ** denote rejection of the 
null at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Figure 1 Data Chile, 1990.01-2001.06 
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Figure 2 Data Mexico, 1986.01-2001.06 
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Figure 3 Chile 
Actual and target inflation (%), 1991.01-2001.06 
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Figure 4 Mexico 
Actual and expected/target inflation (%), 1987.07-2001.06 
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Figure 5 
2M velocity in Chile and Mexico 
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Figure 6 Output, money, and exchange rate gaps 
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Figure 7 GIRs of *   to one S.E. shock in the equation for (a) ( *m m ) and 
(b) *( )HPF y y , Chile 
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Figure 8 GIRs of *   to one S.E. shock in the equation for the (a) ( *e e ), 
(b) REXR , and (c) m , Mexico 
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Figure 8 continued… 
 
(c) 
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Appendix 1 Data definitions and sources 
 
Table A1 Chile and Mexico 
Data definitions and sources 
 
Variables Chile Mexico 
M  
2M A , real private money, monthly 
averages in thousands of millions of 
1986 Chilean Pesos. 
2 1M M  + internal financial assets in the 
hands of residents, thousands of Mexican  
Pesos.  
Y  Monthly indicator of economic activity, 
IMAE, 1986 = 100. 
Industrial production index, 1993 = base. 
R  PRBC, 90 days in annual percentage 
points.  
Interest rate of 28 days CETES, in annual 
percentage points.  
E  Observed monthly exchange rate,  
Chilean Pesos per United States Dollar. 
 
Exchange rate, Mexican Pesos per United 
States Dollar, monthly average. 
DP  Producer price index, June 1992 = 100. 
 
Wholesale price index, excluding oil,  
1994 = base. 
P  Consumer price index,  
December 1998 = 100.  
Consumer price index, 1994 = base. 
*P  Foreign (US) producer price index, 1982 = base, from the FRED of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis (http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/ppi/ppiaco). 
 
Sources. 
Chile: Unless otherwise indicated, Central Bank of Chile, http://www.bcentral.cl/Indicadores/eindicadores.htm. 
Mexico: Unless otherwise indicated, Central Bank of Mexico, http://www.banxico.org.mx/eInfoFinanciera/FSinfoFinanciera.html. 
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Appendix 2 Econometric estimation of the inflation target for Mexico,  
1987.04-2001.06 
 
In the light of the fact that Mexico adopted a formal inflation target from January 1999, 
a proxy for an ‘implicit’ inflation target ( ˆ ) is estimated using a univariate structural 
time series model (Harvey, 1989). Details on the specification and related statistics are 
displayed in Table A2. 
 
Table A2 Univariate time series structural time series model 
for inflation in Mexico, 1987.04-2001.06 
 
Model 
ˆ
t = Fixed level + cycle + irregular + interventions 
Statistics 
Level (final state vector)  
= 0.0052 
T-ratio = 5.0692 
RMSE = 0.00103 
Standard error of equation 0.0084 
RPEV 0.000071 
2
dR  0.8726 
2
sR  0.8724 
 
Notes: RMSE = root mean square error. RPEV = residuals prediction error 
variance.
2
dR and
2
sR are goodness of fit statistics that compare the results with a random 
walk plus drift and a random walk with fixed seasonal dummies, respectively. See 
Koopman et al (2000) for details on these tests. 
 
1. The baseline specification employed for the case at hand is based on  a ‘local 
linear trend’ model that can be written as 
,
2
ˆ
(0, ).
t t t
t NID 
  
 
 

         (A1) 
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In this application, the model search process led to an equation in which the level (  ) is 
fixed, i.e. does not contains a stochastic element. 
Furthermore 
2. Two lags of the dependent variable are used in fitting (A1). 
3. Cycle and irregular components are also added to equation (A1). Further details 
on the rationality of these elements, notably the first, can be found in Koopman 
et al (2000).  
4. Interventions affecting   in (A1) are included in the periods 1987.12, 1988.01, 
and 1988.02 to account for the impact of ‘The Pacto’ economic program.  
5. All the elements outlined in points 2. to 4. are statistically significant at the 1% 
level, with the exception of the intervention for 1988.01 which is so at the 2% 
level. 
6. The fitted model is used to calculate the filtered estimate of the trend in (A1) at 
all points in the sample, (remarkably) using only data available up to the 
previous period, i.e. 
1
ˆ
t t


. Therefore, the ‘econometric inflation target’ intends 
to reproduce the economic agents’ expected central bank inflation objective. 
Empirically, this is achieved by using a technically compelling updating 
technology, the Kalman filter, to estimate the state ( ). 
7. Note that the   implied by the final state vector, reported in Table A2, is 
0.0052, which amounts to an annual inflation rate of 0.0624 (6.24%) at the end 
of the sample period. 
Further details on the above exercise can be obtained from the author upon request.  
